Objective/Meaning The e-commerce model represented by F2C has been continuously expanded to the agricultural field, which has improved the quality of agricultural products to a certain extent. However, the ranking mechanism of “product quality signal + bidding amount” and the “winner-take-all” model may lead to speculation and low quality risks, affecting the quality security of agricultural products. By analyzing the conditions and equilibrium state of the supply of high-quality agricultural products among the e-commerce platform, farmers and consumers, it aimed to give more targeted suggestions to help improve the quality and sales of agricultural products.

Methods/Procedures In this paper, Python was used to carry out the simulation experiments and numerical simulations, and then the tripartite evolutionary game model of e-commerce platform, peasant households and consumers was constructed to analyze the influence of the initial willingness of each subject and different factors on the choice of tripartite strategies.

Results/Conclusions The initial willingness of the e-commerce platform and peasant households would have an important impact on the final result of the evolutionary game; the increase in the probability of investigation and punishment of e-commerce platform could play a good deterrent role for farmers and promote the evolutionary game to approach the ideal state faster; the consumer behavior was difficult to affect the convergence direction of the evolutionary game, and could only passively accept the product information provided by the e-commerce platform and farmers. Based on this, some countermeasures were put forward, including establishing a variety of incentive mechanisms, improving the inspection efficiency and reducing the costs, implementing the necessary constraint measures, and establishing the feedback mechanism of consumers.